Bushies: Iraqi leader 'ignorant' or outgunned?

Posted by Mark Silva at 4:50 am CST

RIGA, Latvia – Following the leak of a memorandum in which President Bush's national security adviser pointedly questioned the competence of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's young government in confronting sectarian violence within Iraq, the Bush administration insisted today it has faith in al-Maliki.

"The president has confidence in Prime Minister Maliki, and also the administration is working with the prime minister to improve his capabilities in terms of dealing with the fundamental challenges in Iraq,'' Tony Snow, the White House press secretary, told reporters in Riga this morning.

This stood in dramatic contrast to a classified administration memo stating "the reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action.'' Some of the government's actions, the memo states, have actually contributed to sectarian strife.

Stephen Hadley, the president's national security adviser, was not making a "summary judgment'' about the government in Iraq, senior administration officials insist. But they are devoting a serious amount of time today to damage control over the judgments that Hadley did make in a leaked memo. Photo by NATO.

Hours before a meeting planned between Bush and al-Maliki in Jordan, the Bush administration is engaged in full-bore diplomatic damage control.

"Prime Minister Maliki also has been very aggressive in recent weeks in taking on some of the key challenges,'' Snow said. "He has been taking a good hard look at police forces in trying to comb out those taking part in acts of violence… He understands that ultimately it is going to be the Iraqi people who have to government, sustain and defend themselves.''

Yet the published report of National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley's five-page memo, written Nov. 8 following a visit to Baghdad, increases the tension surrounding President Bush's planned meetings with al-Maliki in Amman, Jordan, tonight and Thursday. The two leaders plan a meeting and then dinner at the palace with their Jordanian host, King Abdullah II, this evening and then further meetings on Thursday.

Senior administration officials acknowledged today that Bush and al-Maliki will face some "candid'' discussions, following the publication of the memo on the New York Times Web-site:

"The reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action,'' Hadley reportedly wrote in his memo classified as secret, noting that U.S. military commanders in Iraq had voiced concerns about al-Maliki.

"Despite Maliki’s reassuring words, repeated reports from our commanders on the ground contributed to our concerns about Maliki’s government,'' wrote Hadley, citing a failure to deliver services to Sunni areas, lack of intervention by the prime minister's office in the prevention of military action against Shia targets while acting "to encourage them against Sunni ones'' and the removal of Iraq’s "most effective commanders'' on a sectarian basis as part of efforts "to ensure Shia majorities in all ministries.''

"While there does seem to be an aggressive push to consolidate Shia power and influence, it is less clear whether Maliki is a witting participant,'' Hadley reported in his five-page memo. "The information he receives is undoubtedly skewed by his small circle of Dawa advisers, coloring his actions and interpretation of reality. His intentions seem good when he talks with Americans, and sensitive reporting suggests he is trying to stand up to the Shia hierarchy and force positive change.''

Senior administration officials say al-Maliki already has taken some of the steps that Hadley recommended in the memo, such as cracking down on violent police forces within the Interior Ministry. Yet the Hadley memo notes: "It is important that we see some tangible results in this strategy soon.''

The judgments contained in Hadley's memo contrast sharply with his own public words in recent days as well as the administration's public pronouncements about the al-Maliki-led government in Iraq

"When you're in war-time, you're going to ask tough questions,'' a senior administration official said today in Riga, insisting on anonymity when discussing a classified document and insisting the administration has not "cast judgment'' on al-Maliki's government. "The bulk of the memo demonstrates that it's a capability issue,'' this official said. "Because you raise the range of possibilities, doesn’t mean you're casting judgment… It's not to say that it's a slap in the face, but how do we raise his capability?

"Obvious points of assessment are being made,'' this official said. "But the raw conclusion, as identified in that memo, is capability…We have acknowledged that one of the central tents of this meeting is how to turn (al-Maliki's) good intentions into concrete action…. He believes he needs greater autonomy and control.''

The two leaders expect to discuss the transfer of responsibility for security in Iraq from U.S.-led forces to Iraqi forces, which Bush has maintained is essential before the U.S. discusses any troop withdrawal.

"If you take a look at key parts of the memo, you have a constant reiteration about strengthening the Maliki government,'' another senior administration official said. "This, in fact, has become the focal point of U.S.-Iraqi cooperation…The approach of this government is how we can help.

"There is not a summary judgment of Prime Minister Maliki,'' this official said. "Instead, there is enormous respect for the challenges that he faces.''

While the Bush administration has accused Iran and Syria of abetting terrorists inside Iraq – yet has remained reluctant to speak directly with either Iran or Syria – Hadley's memo suggests that his predecessor as national security adviser, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, hold an "Iraq-plus neighbors meeting in the region in early December.'' Asked if this might include Iran and Syria, officials declined to comment today.

Hadley also has recommended "getting Saudi Arabia to take a leadership role,'' including "cutting off any public or private funds to insurgents or death squads'' and acting aggressively "to lean on Syria.'' Vice President Dick Cheney traveled to Saudi Arabia over the weekend for a meeting with King Abdullah, which the Bush administration has refused to publicly comment on – with Hadley calling it a "confidential conversation.''

Hadley's memo outlined "steps'' that al-Maliki should take to improve the situation: Compelling his ministers to provide health services and open bank branches in Sunni neighborhoods "to demonstrate that his government serves all ethnic communities: Confronting the Shiite cleric leader Moktada al-Sadar and "bring to justice'' any "actors'' who do not eschew violence; Shaking up his Cabinet by appointing "non-sectarian, capable technocrats;'' Overhauling his own staff to "reflect the face of Iraq;'' demanding that all government workers publicly renounce violence as condition for keeping their jobs; supporting the renewal of a United Nations mandate for multinational forces; negotiating a "status of forces agreement'' with the United States over the next year; expanding the Iraqi army and immediately suspending "suspect Iraqi police units.''

Yesterday -- upon arrival in Riga, and as Bush prepares for meetings with al-Maliki in Jordan tonight and Thursday – Hadley had offered a more optimistic assessment of Maliki's government: "We think that this unity government is doing pretty well in a very difficult situation,'' Hadley had said here in Riga. "What I'm saying to you is Maliki has been impatient, and has said that his government has not produced the results that they seek, and he's got some ideas about how to enhance their capabilities to do so.

"This is a pretty tall order for a government, and, at the same time, you're building your government institutions and your security institutions from the ground up,'' Hadley said Tuesday. "This is a big challenge. This is a big challenge for a very sophisticated and well-established democracy, much less a country -- a big challenge for a country with the political institutions he's got.

"So I don't think one should be surprised that it is not moving at the speed that he wants it to move,'' Hadley had added. "This is a huge challenge, and this government needs our support. All I'm saying is, they are not making the progress we would like, they are not making the progress they would like, and there's some reasons for that, because they face a very challenging situation.''

But the president's national security adviser had returned from Iraq on Oct. 30 with a far more candid and sobering assessment, detailed in a Nov. 8 memo which has been classified as secret and was read to and reported by the Times, which published a text of the memo on its Web-site today.

Senior Bush administration officials commented in detail on the leaked memo today, insisting upon anonymity when commenting on a classified document. This is the published text:

"We returned from Iraq convinced we need to determine if Prime Minister Maliki is both willing and able to rise above the sectarian agendas being promoted by others. Do we and Prime Minister Maliki share the same vision for Iraq? If so, is he able to curb those who seek Shia hegemony or the reassertion of Sunni power? The answers to these questions are key in determining whether we have the right strategy in Iraq. Maliki reiterated a vision of Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish partnership, and in my one-on-one meeting with him, he impressed me as a leader who wanted to be strong but was having difficulty figuring out how to do so.

" Maliki pointed to incidents, such as the use of Iraqi forces in Shia Karbala, to demonstrate his even hand. Perhaps because he is frustrated over his limited ability to command Iraqi forces against terrorists and insurgents, Maliki has been trying to show strength by standing up to the coalition. Hence the public spats with us over benchmarks and the Sadr City roadblocks.

"Despite Maliki’s reassuring words, repeated reports from our commanders on the ground contributed to our concerns about Maliki’s government. Reports of nondelivery of services to Sunni areas, intervention by the prime minister’s office to stop military action against Shia targets and to encourage them against Sunni ones, removal of Iraq’s most effective commanders on a sectarian basis and efforts to ensure Shia majorities in all ministries — when combined with the escalation of Jaish al-Mahdi’s (JAM) [the Arabic name for the Mahdi Army] killings — all suggest a campaign to consolidate Shia power in Baghdad.

"While there does seem to be an aggressive push to consolidate Shia power and influence, it is less clear whether Maliki is a witting participant. The information he receives is undoubtedly skewed by his small circle of Dawa advisers, coloring his actions and interpretation of reality. His intentions seem good when he talks with Americans, and sensitive reporting suggests he is trying to stand up to the Shia hierarchy and force positive change. But the reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action.

"Steps Maliki Could Take

"There is a range of actions that Maliki could take to improve the information he receives, demonstrate his intentions to build an Iraq for all Iraqis and increase his capabilities. The actions listed below are in order of escalating difficulty and, at some point, may require additional political and security resources to execute, as described on Page 3 of this memo. Maliki should:

"Compel his ministers to take small steps — such as providing health services and opening bank branches in Sunni neighborhoods — to demonstrate that his government serves all ethnic communities.

"Bring his political strategy with Moktada al-Sadr to closure and bring to justice any JAM actors that do not eschew violence.

"Shake up his cabinet by appointing nonsectarian, capable technocrats in key service (and security) ministries.

"Announce an overhaul of his own personal staff so that “it reflects the face of Iraq.

"Demand that all government workers (in ministries, the Council of Representatives and his own offices) publicly renounce all violence for the pursuit of political goals as a condition for keeping their positions.

"Declare that Iraq will support the renewal of the U.N. mandate for multinational forces and will seek, as appropriate, to address bilateral issues with the United States through a SOFA [status of forces agreement] to be negotiated over the next year.

"Take one or more immediate steps to inject momentum back into the reconciliation process, such as a suspension of de-Baathification measures and the submission to the Parliament or “Council of Representatives” of a draft piece of legislation for a more judicial approach.

"Announce plans to expand the Iraqi Army over the next nine months; and

Declare the immediate suspension of suspect Iraqi police units and a robust program of embedding coalition forces into MOI [Ministry of the Interior] units while the MOI is revetted and retrained.

"What We Can Do to Help Maliki

"If Maliki is willing to move decisively on the actions above, we can help him in a variety of ways. We should be willing to:

"Continue to target al-Qaeda and insurgent strongholds in Baghdad to demonstrate the Shia do not need the JAM to protect their families — and that we are a reliable partner;

"Encourage Zal [Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador] to move into the background and let Maliki take more credit for positive developments. (We want Maliki to exert his authority — and demonstrate to Iraqis that he is a strong leader — by taking action against extremists, not by pushing back on the United States and the Coalition.);

"Continue our diplomatic efforts to keep the Sunnis in the political process by pushing for the negotiation of a national compact and by talking up provincial council elections next spring/summer as a mechanism for Sunni empowerment;

"Support his announcement to expand the Iraqi Army and reform the MOI more aggressively;

"Seek ways to strengthen Maliki immediately by giving him additional control over Iraqi forces, although we must recognize that in the immediate time frame, we would likely be able to give him more authority over existing forces, not more forces;

"Continue to pressure Iran and Syria to end their interference in Iraq, in part by hitting back at Iranian proxies in Iraq and by Secretary Rice holding an Iraq-plus-neighbors meeting in the region in early December; and

"Step up our efforts to get Saudi Arabia to take a leadership role in supporting Iraq by using its influence to move Sunni populations in Iraq out of violence into politics, to cut off any public or private funding provided to the insurgents or death squads from the region and to lean on Syria to terminate its support for Baathists and insurgent leaders.

Augmenting Maliki’s Political and Security Capabilities

"The above approach may prove difficult to execute even if Maliki has the right intentions. He may simply not have the political or security capabilities to take such steps, which risk alienating his narrow Sadrist political base and require a greater number of more reliable forces. Pushing Maliki to take these steps without augmenting his capabilities could force him to failure — if the Parliament removes him from office with a majority vote or if action against the Mahdi militia (JAM) causes elements of the Iraqi Security Forces to fracture and leads to major Shia disturbances in southern Iraq. We must also be mindful of Maliki’s personal history as a figure in the Dawa Party — an underground conspiratorial movement — during Saddam’s rule. Maliki and those around him are naturally inclined to distrust new actors, and it may take strong assurances from the United States ultimately to convince him to expand his circle of advisers or take action against the interests of his own Shia coalition and for the benefit of Iraq as a whole.

"If it is Maliki’s assessment that he does not have the capability — politically or militarily — to take the steps outlined above, we will need to work with him to augment his capabilities. We could do so in two ways. First, we could help him form a new political base among moderate politicians from Sunni, Shia, Kurdish and other communities. Ideally, this base would constitute a new parliamentary bloc that would free Maliki from his current narrow reliance on Shia actors. (This bloc would not require a new election, but would rather involve a realignment of political actors within the Parliament). In its creation, Maliki would need to be willing to risk alienating some of his Shia political base and may need to get the approval of Ayatollah Sistani for actions that could split the Shia politically. Second, we need to provide Maliki with additional forces of some kind.

"This approach would require that we take steps beyond those laid out above, to include:

"Actively support Maliki in helping him develop an alternative political base. We would likely need to use our own political capital to press moderates to align themselves with Maliki’s new political bloc;

"Consider monetary support to moderate groups that have been seeking to break with larger, more sectarian parties, as well as to support Maliki himself as he declares himself the leader of his bloc and risks his position within Dawa and the Sadrists; and

"Provide Maliki with more resources to help build a nonsectarian national movement.

"• If we expect him to adopt a nonsectarian security agenda, we must ensure he has reasonably nonsectarian security institutions to execute it — such as through a more robust embedding program.

"• We might also need to fill the current four-brigade gap in Baghdad with coalition forces if reliable Iraqi forces are not identified.

"Moving Ahead

"We should waste no time in our efforts to determine Maliki’s intentions and, if necessary, to augment his capabilities. We might take the following steps immediately:

"Convince Maliki to deliver on key actions that might reassure Sunnis (open banks and direct electricity rebuilding in Sunni areas, depoliticize hospitals);

"Tell Maliki that we understand that he is working his own strategy for dealing with the Sadrists and that:

"• You have asked General Casey to support Maliki in this effort

" • It is important that we see some tangible results in this strategy soon;

"Send your personal representative to Baghdad to discuss this strategy with Maliki and to press other leaders to work with him, especially if he determines that he must build an alternative political base;

"Ask Casey to develop a plan to empower Maliki, including:

"• Formation of National Strike Forces

"• Dramatic increase in National Police embedding

"-- More forces under Maliki command and control

"Ask Secretary of Defense and General Casey to make a recommendation about whether more forces are need in Baghdad;

"Ask Secretary of Defense and General Casey to devise a more robust embedding plan and a plan to resource it;

"Direct your cabinet to begin an intensive press on Saudi Arabia to play a leadership role on Iraq, connecting this role with other areas in which Saudi Arabia wants to see U.S. action;

"If Maliki seeks to build an alternative political base:

"• Press Sunni and other Iraqi leaders (especially Hakim) [Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Maliki rival] to support Maliki

"• Engage Sistani to reassure and seek his support for a new nonsectarian political movement.

Source of memo text: The New York Times, which senior Bush administration officials commented on in detail today while refraining from confirming the accuracy of a classified document which was leaked.